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ESSAY
TOWARD A HETERODOX PROPERTY
LAW AND ECONOMICS
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Why should we cherish “objectivity,” as if ideas were innocent, as if
they don’t serve one interest or another? Surely, we want to be objec-
tive if that means telling the truth as we see it. . . . But we don’t want
to be objective if it means pretending that ideas don’t play a part in
the social struggles of our time, that we don’t take sides in those strug-
gles. . . . Indeed it is impossible to be neutral.
—Howard Zinn1
I. PROPERTY LAW AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Property law is profoundly unsatisfying.  This statement is not
meant to suggest that property is wrong or bad.  Nor does it mean to
take issue with any particular rule of property law, at least in a way
that is not already reflected in the rich property literature.  Rather,
property law is unsatisfying because, often, its settlements and com-
promises seem wanting and iniquitous, even while envisioned alterna-
tives seem untenable and unfair.  Indeed, the standard first-year
Property syllabus reads like a compendium of the Catch-22.2
For example, the common law doctrine of adverse possession is
rightly described as paradoxical.3  When successfully invoked, abso-
lute title to property is transferred from the legal owner to a tres-
passer, squatter, encroacher, or land thief.  This is an arguably
* Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. As always, a special
thanks to the late, great Frank T. Jansson.
1. HOWARD ZINN, DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE: CROSS-EXAMINING
AMERICAN IDEOLOGY 4–5 (1990).
2. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961). Heller’s classic novel, which satirized bu-
reaucratic quagmires through the experience of U.S. airmen during World War II,
coined the term now used to refer to concepts also described as “circular dilemmas,”
“double binds,” or “no win” situations.
3. See Larissa Katz, The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and
Revolution in Property Law, 55 MCGILL L.J. 47, 72–75 (2010) (suggesting that the
land-thief conception of adverse possession is less persuasive than a revolutionary
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efficient method for allocating resources4 to individuals who either
most value those resources or will use them most “productively.”5
However, it rewards what—except for the expiration of a statutorily
defined prescriptive period6—would be civilly and, sometimes, crimi-
nally actionable conduct and significantly limits an owner’s security
and stability in her right to use her property as she sees fit.
Property is seen and treated like a particularly powerful “trump”7
against competing claims.8  However, while no amount of compensa-
tion is sufficient for the government to, say, impose upon one a partic-
ular religious viewpoint, the payment of “just”9 compensation
authorizes the government to completely destroy a property interest,
so long as the destruction is undertaken for “public use.”10
Patients can assert no proprietary interest in their bodily fluids and
tissues once removed on the operating table,11 but doctors and medi-
cal researchers may transform those same fluids and tissues into lucra-
tive and patentable property.12
4. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the
Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 667, 678 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1129–30
(1985).
5. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 154 (1988)
(“The economic advantage of adverse possession is that it . . . allows property to move
to higher-valuing users.”).
6. Indeed, adverse possession is often neutrally described as a special operation
of the statute of limitations. See John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of
Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 816 (1994) (describing same).
7. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977).
8. On the tension between this perception and the consistency and propriety of
property rights as trumps idea, see Richard A. Epstein, Life in No Trump: Property
and Speech Under the Constitution, 53 ME. L. REV. 23, 23 (2001); Richard A. Epstein,
Property, Speech and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 52–53 (1992);
Laura S. Underkuffler, When Should Rights “Trump”? An Examination of Speech
and Property, 52 ME. L. REV. 311, 313 (2000).
9. On the “justice” of such compensation, see, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and
Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 755 (1999); James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient
Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1279
(1985); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61,
82–83 (1986); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1167
(1967); Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 679 (2005).
10. Criticized as “hortatory fluff,” the very deferential and misnamed requirement
(public use is definitively not required) ostensibly requires some benefit to the public.
See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 497 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
11. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 487–97 (Cal.
1990).
12. Id. This issue was recently brought into popular conscious with the telling of
the backstory of the famed HeLa cell line and its very human biological source,
Henrietta Lacks. See REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS
(2010).
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The integrity and validity of most land titles in the United States
rests on the foundation laid by Johnson v. M’Intosh13 (and its intellec-
tual progeny), which sanctioned the expropriation of Indian lands
based on indefensible assumptions about race and culture.14  Yet, le-
gally redressing any wrong perpetuated by that decision and the acts
and policies it enabled would unsustainably strain prevailing and com-
peting justifications for the institution of private property alike.
Such examples abound not only in the introductory syllabus but
also throughout the canon of property writ large.  As a result, prop-
erty scholars are particularly adroit at apologetics, offering doctrinal
and theoretical narratives that straighten property’s myriad circular
dilemmas.  Nonetheless, it bears repeating: Property law is profoundly
unsatisfying.
Part of the problem is property’s definitional schizophrenia.  Prop-
erty is a central and the foundational institution of American society.
Indeed, it is one of the Trinity of values the promotion of which un-
dergirded the formation of the U.S. government.15  The appellation
denotes a very high level of protection and wide latitude of defer-
ence.16  Nonetheless, not for want of trying, property admits no ac-
cepted and comprehensive definition within Anglo-American
jurisprudence.17  Lay conceptions of property-as-things over which in-
dividuals exercise “that sole despotic dominion”18 are indiscriminately
deployed as a shield and sword in property rhetoric, leading to psy-
chological understandings of property that bear little relation to the
objects of property or its contents.  The Hohfeldian “bundle of rights”
is disaggregated, reduced, and reconstituted without a stable, inviola-
13. Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 67, 67 (2001).
14. For a discussion of the modern implications of this expropriation and its juxta-
position with contemporary eminent domain controversies, see Stacy L. Leeds, By
Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal Perspective on Taking Land, 41
TULSA L. REV. 51, 59 (2005).
15. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. . . .”).
16. The exact nature, level, and scope of that protection and deference are neither
clear nor agreed upon.
17. The definitional debate on property occupies a significant majority of the
scholarship in property theory. For a robust exploration of many facets of the contem-
porary debate, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 531, 531 (2005) (asserting “[n]otwithstanding its importance, prop-
erty law has eluded both a consistent definition and a unified conceptual frame-
work.”).  For an interesting comparative account, see generally ANNA DI ROBILANT,
PROPERTY: A BUNDLE OF STICKS OR A TREE? (2013).
18. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 18
(London, A. Strahan 1825).
492 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
ble core, which threatens the “individuation” of property as a field.19
While the definition of property as a set of relationships among peo-
ple with respect to things20 seems precise, it conveys little substantive
information. All these conceptualizations of property leave something
wanting.
Compounding the problems posed by property’s definition is prop-
erty’s counter-intuitive (and expanding) violability.21  Most of prop-
erty law consists of  determinations of the ways and circumstances in
which property can be circumscribed.  Adverse possession and emi-
nent domain doctrines determine when an individual may lose her
property.  Nuisance law and the public trust doctrine circumscribe an
owner’s use and control of his property.  Trespass limits the scope of
the right to exclude.
The tensions created by the definition and violability of property
mask deeper vectors of discontent.  Valued resources, their control,
and their distribution merely constitute the terrain on which a conflict
is waged.  Whatever its precise definition and scope, properly con-
ceived, property, at its core, represents the conflict between individual
liberty and interest, on one hand, and community well-being and
equality, on the other.22  These equally important values or categories
are not just non-fungible, but they are incommensurable and, largely,
non-aggregative at the margin.  That is, in each individual conflict a
gain for one is a loss for the other.  Where individual liberty wins, the
community or equality loses.
A third vector of disaffection lies in property’s commitment to sta-
bility, immobility, and stasis23—“reflexively resistant to change, pre-
serving as it does the realm of settled expectation.”24  From this
stance, property, by and large, serves to maintain the status quo distri-
butions of not just property but other resources, assets, and opportu-
19. But see Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property
Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 57, 66–67 (2013).
20. Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitle-
ment, in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNER-
SHIP 3, 10 (Charles Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000).
21. Moreover, apart from the definitional question, property law is largely sub-
sumed by other existing legal specialties.  That is, the rules governing property are
implemented via tort law and contract law, etc.  Perhaps due to the persistence of the
definitional debate and its dependence on other fields for its implementation, prop-
erty is often discounted as an important object of independent, coherent analysis.
22. The preceding is an expansion and revision of an idea expressed by Robert
Ellickson. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1345 (1993).
23. At the helm of the contemporary discussion of this ideal are Thomas W. Mer-
rill & Henry E. Smith. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality
of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Princi-
ple, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). For an overview of this value’s critics, see, e.g., Nestor M.
Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 444 (2011).
24. Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1607, 1659 (2010).
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nities (especially wealth and power) correlated therewith and
facilitated thereby.  But, an essential justification of property is that it
promotes individual freedom—whether defined as autonomy, power,
or independence.25  In the context of historical inequities or imbal-
ances in the mechanisms for this distribution of property, freedom jus-
tifications for property—at least to the extent of their populist
appeal—are less persuasive as the freedom promoted by property is
that of historically privileged players.
These deeper cleavages generating property’s discontent are often
reflected in the methodological influences apparent in property dis-
course.  Economics, as popularly defined in law, is the science of
scarce resource allocation.26  Property law creates the strictures and
structures within which resources are allocated and controlled.  It is
not surprising, then, that the economic analysis of law enjoys signifi-
cant traction in property jurisprudence.  However, the dominant
school of economic thought, neoclassical,27 outwardly disengages with
the deontological tug-of-war at the heart of property’s discontents.
Instead, the normative position of economically influenced property
analysis proclaims that the law should be designed to lead to the effi-
cient allocation of resources.28  It is  not surprising that a well-estab-
lished cadre of voices reject this premise.  These latter voices focus not
only on the instrumental values of property, which may be served by
concepts like efficiency, but also on the underlying ontological, episte-
mological, and/or transformational significance of property, which
may not.29
Oriented as they are towards different sides of the cleavages of dis-
content these groups (painted in admittedly broad strokes) do not
and, more importantly, cannot answer the challenges of the other, ren-
dering property intractably unsatisfactory.  The pages that follow con-
tribute to both these traditions, suggesting that heterodox economic
analyses of property law may offer property law a discourse that satis-
fies the competing considerations animating the field.
25. See D. Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 36
(2009) (exploring varying claims on property’s connection to freedom).
26. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (8th ed. 2011) (“[T]he
science of rational choice in a world . . . in which resources are limited in relation to
human wants”).
27. This essay generally uses the terms “neoclassical” and “mainstream” to refer
to dominant approaches to economics. While not devoid of controversy, see infra note
30, there is no better characterization of the body of economic thought to which het-
erodox economics is oriented.
28. R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 56 J.L. & ECON. 879,
901 (2013) (reprinted) (“[T]o establish that clear delimitation of rights on the basis of
which the transfer and recombination of rights can take place through the market”).
29. Jane Baron’s The Contested Commitments of Property characterizes these
cleavages less generally, but very clearly articulates and analyzes the reflection of
property’s cleavages in modern discourse. See generally Jane B. Baron, The Contested
Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (2010) (contrasting the “informa-
tional” approach with “progressive” approaches).
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II. HETERODOX ECONOMICS 101
The stories of economics and of law and economics have been told
and retold.  Out of those stories flow some fairly incontrovertible real-
ities.  First, neoclassical economics enjoys a position of dominance
within the field of economics.30  Second, that dominance rises to the
level of hegemony in law and economics.  And, third, in neoclassical
economics, “markets are the center of a competitive system that, on
the basis of certain assumptions, tend to equilibrium.”31  Those as-
sumptions include the idea that participation in that market is volun-
tary, informed, and rational (i.e., utility maximizing).  The implication
of this baseline analysis is that markets are self-regulating.  This is the
take away of the Coase Theorem,32 which is essentially an analytical
codification of the core assumptions of neoclassical economics.33 In
the perfect world, the specific content of law does not matter.  Individ-
uals will find their way to the efficient outcome through market
exchange.
Law and economics, as a positive project, diagnoses and predicts
how law incentivizes the behavior of rational actors.  As a normative
project, it aims to approximate the Coasean outcome—i.e., the market
outcome, or “efficiency”—in the real world, where the neoclassical
assumptions do not hold.  In other words, normative law and econom-
ics attempts to achieve the optimal allocation of scarce resources by
30. Among the evidence of this dominance is this insightful excerpt from noted
economic theorist, Tony Lawson:
Currently, the term ‘neoclassical’ pervades the discourse of academic eco-
nomics, being employed to denote a range of substantive theories and policy
stances. . . . but the term is invariably employed rather loosely and somewhat
inconsistently across different contributors. . . . For many the act of describ-
ing an economic contribution as neoclassical is considered a form of criti-
cism, though usually when the term is so used it is so without explanation or
elaboration; it mostly signals dissent. In similar fashion those who accept the
term for their own output seem very often, and again mostly without defini-
tion or explanation, to suppose that any contribution they make is neoclassi-
cal in nature.
Tony Lawson, What is this ‘School’ Called Neoclassical Economics?, CAMBRIDGE J. L.
& ECON. 2013, 1–2.
31. Damien Cahill & Joy Paton, ‘Thinking Socially’ About Markets, 68 J. AUSTRA-
LIAN POL. ECON. 9 (2011).
32. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
33. See id. Reference is made to the Coase Theorem in recognition of the unequiv-
ocally foundational, indeed inaugurating, role his work generally, and especially the
concepts memorialized in the Coase Theorem, play in law and economics. RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23 (6th ed. 2003) (stating that law and
economics began with Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost). For an interesting study
of this influence, see William M. Landes & Sonia Lahr-Pastor, Measuring Coase’s In-
fluence, 54 J.L. & ECON. S383 (2011) (measuring Coase’s influence via citation count).
For a compelling historiography of Coase, the Coase Theorem, and the emergence of
law and economics, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins
of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499 (2011).
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creating legal structures and legal settlements that put those scarce
resources in the hands of those who “value” them most (where the
value is measured by willingness to pay).
The neoclassical movement and its normative conclusions have in-
delibly influenced modern property.  A body of justly distinguished
property scholarship rests on the foundation that property, as an insti-
tution, is aimed at enhancing the neoclassical concept of utility.  That
is, property is a tool or agent of efficiency, or welfare maximization.
Moreover, noted scholars have convincingly made the case for the in-
extricability of property and economics.34
The hegemony of neoclassical economics within law and economics
is hardly surprising, given its dominance within the field of economics.
But, it should not be construed as an absence of critique, diversity, or
debate.  Commitment to the core assumptions of neoclassical econom-
ics varies significantly even among those clearly situated within that
tradition.35  And, mainstream dissenters have challenged the core as-
sumptions of the school and lamented (or joked about) its inability to
accurately predict, reflect, or explain human behavior.  Experimental,
behavioral, public choice, and new institutional economics—for exam-
ple—have emerged to challenge, revise, ground, and/or refine the key
assumptions and values of neoclassical economics.  The insights of
these approaches have been deployed by an increasing number of law
and economics practitioners.36 Indeed, many of the most sustained
contributors to law and economics, particularly the law and economics
of property (much to the credit of the field), may be best character-
ized as proponents of these critical schools of economic thought.37
34. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, The Law and Economics Approach to Property, 3
PROP. L. REV. 212 (2014); Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, What Happened to
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001).
35. Jakob Kapeller & Leonhard Dobusch, Heterodox United vs. Mainstream City?
Sketching a Framework for Interested Pluralism in Economics. 46 J. ECON. ISSUES 4,
1035, 1036 (2013).
36. See, e.g., SHOSHANA GROSSBARD–SHECHTMAN & CHRISTOPHER CLAGUE,
THE EXPANSION OF ECONOMICS: TOWARD A MORE INCLUSIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE
(2002); ROBIN PAUL MALLOY AND CHRISTOPHER K. BRAUN, LAW AND ECONOMICS:
NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (1995); NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G.
MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POSTMODERNISM AND BE-
YOND (2d ed. 2006); MARGARET OPPENHEIMER & NICHOLAS MERCURO, LAW AND
ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND REGULATORY
ISSUES (2005).
37. New Institutionalism is the clearest example. Most significantly, in this re-
spect—founding father of law and economics—Coase himself, is often characterized
as a “new institutionalist,” see Hovenkamp, supra note 33, and the work of Neil
Komesar (also a property scholar) constitutes canon of the self-consciously institu-
tional approach. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING IN-
STITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); NEIL K. KOMESAR,
LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 181
(2001). Elinor Ostrom, who was not a lawyer but whose work on the commons forms
part of the property law canon, also engaged in analysis from this perspective. See,
e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONS: BEYOND MARKET FAILURE
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Heterodox economics disagrees more fundamentally with neoclassi-
cal economics.38  Fredric Lee, a fierce proponent of heterodox eco-
nomic traditions, described the divide rather opaquely in these terms:
Mainstream economic theory explains “how asocial, ahistorical indi-
viduals choose among scarce resources to meet competing ends
given unlimited wants” whereas heterodox economics theorizes
“human agency in a cultural context and social processes in histori-
cal time affecting resources, consumption patterns, production and
reproduction, and the meaning (or ideology) of economic activities
engaged in social provisioning.
But, comprised of a spectrum of competing, conflicting, and some-
times mutually antipathetic perspectives, heterodox schools resist
common definition beyond their opposition to—and often marginal-
ization from—mainstream economics.39
AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION (2012). Within property law disciplines specifically,
Daniel H. Cole has advanced this approach, see, e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z.
Grossman, Institutions Matter! Why the Herder Problem Is Not a Prisoners’ Dilemma,
69 THEORY & DECISION 219 (2010); Daniel H. Cole, Political Institutions, Judicial
Review, and Private Property: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 15 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 141 (2007). Edward Rubin’s analysis of property as an institution pro-
vides a good basis for identifying the influence of the institutionalist perspective in
property scholarship more generally. Edward L. Rubin, The Illusion of Property as a
Right and Its Reality as an Imperfect Alternative, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 573.
Other examples include a budding behavioral economics of property law, see
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Importance of Being Earnest: Two Notions of Inter-
nalization; 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 37 (2015); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not
Always Better Than Less: An Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634
(2008); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability
Rules Revisited: Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEX. L. REV. 219
(2001) public choice alternatives, see, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency
Versus Public Choice: The Case of Property Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49
B.C. L. REV. 673 (2008); Bruce Yandle, Public Choice at the Intersection of Environ-
mental Law and Economics, 8 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 5, 5–27 (1999); A. ALLAN SCHMID,
PROPERTY, POWER, AND PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND ECONOMICS
(2nd ed. 1987); and, largely in intellectual property, experimental economics, see, e.g.,
Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Crea-
tivity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV 1921 (2014).
38. The term “heterodox” has occasionally been used to refer to any economic
perspectives that are not neoclassical. See, e.g., Alain Marciano & Giovanni B.
Ramello, Consent, Choice, and Guido Calabresi’s Heterodox Economic Analysis of
Law, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 100 (2014) (defining Calabresi’s economic analy-
sis of law as heterodox because it was “not truly neoclassical”); MARGARET OPPEN-
HEIMER & NICHOLAS MERCURO, LAW AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC
APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES (2005) (describing as heterodox a
broad range of mainstream perspectives to economics).
39. Indeed it is defined in the NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2d
ed. 2008) in just such terms:
[H]eterodox economics refers to a body of economic theories that holds an
alternative position vis-à-vis mainstream economics; to a community of het-
erodox economists who identify themselves as such and embrace a pluralistic
attitude towards heterodox theories without rejecting contestability and in-
commensurability among heterodox theories; and to the development of a
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For example, so-called Austrian economics—associated with the
work of Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, Mur-
ray Rothbard, and Israel Kirzner—with its anarcho-capitalist or ex-
treme libertarian (minarchist) commitments—elevates the market and
private property as the agent of the market above their already privi-
leged positions in neoclassical thought.40 Nonetheless, Austrian school
economists reject the perfection reflected in neoclassical economic as-
sumptions and its framing of equilibrium as an ideal.  Instead, Aus-
trian economics is committed to a critical realist and human-centered
approach in which fallible human actors interact in an evolutionary
and ceaselessly correcting ordering process best structured in the
market.41
In contemporary (old) institutionalism42—associated with Thorstein
Veblen and John Kenneth Galbraith—the institutions that create the
rules of the game become the focus of economic analysis rather than
taken as a given.43 Its defining characteristic is the rejection of neo-
classical economics’ revealed preferences that are outside the scope of
economic analysis in favor of endogenous preference formation—the
explication of which is a central task, since institutions impact, influ-
ence, and may even determine and constitute the core inputs of neo-
classical analysis.  For example, social relations constitute identity and,
thus, preferences.44
Marxist-radical economics might be placed at the other end of the
heterodox spectrum.  These approaches are founded not on assump-
tions about human nature (i.e. rationality) and agency (i.e. that human
actors choose freely), but on assumptions about social relationships,
arrangements, and hierarchies—generally conceived as “class.”
Along this reorientation, economics is not about understanding the
mechanisms for facilitating market participation but about mitigating
and mediating class exploitation.45
coherent economic theory that draws upon various theoretical contributions
by heterodox approaches which stand in contrast to mainstream theory.
40. For a review of this critique, see Peter J.  Boettke, Where Did Economics Go
Wrong? Modern Economics as a Flight from Reality, 11 Critical Rev. 11, 11–64 (1997).
41. See, e.g., Peter Boettke, Why Are There No Austrian Socialists? Ideology, Sci-
ence and the Austrian School, 17 J. HIS. ECON. THOUGHT, Spring 1995, at 35–56.
42. This tradition, which originally emerged as a rejection of classical economic
hedonism but continues as a critique of neoclassical economics on much the same
grounds, is distinct from new institutional economics which has considerable traction
as a mainstream response to neoclassical economics and is very influential—arguably
foundational—within law and economics scholarship, including property law and eco-
nomics. See supra note 37.
43. For an overview of this school of economic thought, see Geoffrey M. Hodgson,
What Is the Essence of Institutional Economics?, 34 J. ECON. ISSUES 317, 317–29
(2000).
44. See, e.g., Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Characterizing Institutional and Heterodox Ec-
onomics—A Reply to Tony Lawson, 2 EVOL. INST. ECON. REV. 3–5 (2006).
45. See RICHARD D. WOLFF & STEPHEN RESNICK, ECONOMICS: MARXIAN VERSUS
NEOCLASSICAL (1987).
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Feminist economics—a categorization that itself reflects a variety of
schools of feminist thought (liberal, radical, Marxist, separatist, inter-
sectional, etc.)—demonstrates a similar reorientation by highlighting
the androcentric foundation of mainstream economics.46 These ap-
proaches suggest that the idea of “objectivity” central to the mathe-
matical approach to economics held sacrosanct within the mainstream
is itself the reification of masculinity and denigration of femininity,
which is associated with subjectivity.47  Feminist heterodox ap-
proaches to economics also reject the unstated inputs of concepts like
optimality and scarcity, question the market as the principal site of
resource ordering, and deny the postulate of both self-interest and
choice.
Snapshots of Sraffian, post-Keynesian, evolutionary, ecological, and
all the other heterodox schools,48 would complete the gradients in the
broad heterodox spectrum. Notwithstanding the divergent range of
foci, goals, and commitments represented thereby, heterodox eco-
nomics schools share important commonalties beyond that of a persis-
tent and arguably incommensurable challenge to the foundations of
neoclassical economics.
First, they take history, context, power, and structure seriously, to
see economics as socially grounded and constituted.  Thus, rather than
abstract modeling and predicting, “[t]heir intellectual efforts are gen-
erally geared to understanding the broader institutional, or social,
context, its organization, and impacts on pricing, distribution and, of
course, production.”49
Second, and more important, liberated from the reductive require-
ments of abstract modeling—the hallmark of neoclassical economics’
scientific approach—heterodox economics self-consciously and trans-
parently embeds its values and social philosophies into its descriptions
and its prescriptions.50 Especially in an era in which voices in main-
stream economics are paying increasingly sustained attention to heter-
46. The essays in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS
(Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993) and FEMINIST ECONOMICS TODAY:
BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN (Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 2003) provide a thorough
introduction to the critiques that feminist economic thought raises against mainstream
economics.
47. For a chart depicting the masculine/feminine binary (which itself is critiqued
by, for example, feminist and queer theorists) as employed in some feminist econom-
ics, see JULIE A. NELSON, FEMINISM, OBJECTIVITY, & ECONOMICS 7 (2003).
48. For a list of schools, see Marc Pilkington, Economics as a Polymorphic Discur-
sive Construct: Heterodoxy and Pluralism, 20 ON THE HORIZON 3, 239.
49. Cahill & Paton, supra at 31.
50. Fredric S. Lee, Heterodox Economics and Its Critics, in IN DEFENSE OF POST-
KEYNESIAN AND HETERODOX ECONOMICS: RESPONSES TO THEIR CRITICS 108–109
(Frederic S. Lee and Marc Lavoie, eds., 2013) (“[T]he ethos embedded in heterodox
economic theory is that the social provisioning process is to be accurately explained so
that it can be changed—an accurate explanation is not the same thing as a value
neutral explanation, which implies that derivative economic policy is not value qua
ethically neutral.”)
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odox economic substantive critiques,51 it is this latter quality that
maintains the largely marginalized status of heterodox economics
within contemporary economic thought.  However, it is this latter
quality that makes heterodox economics a viable candidate to relieve
property law’s discontents.
III. A HETERODOX LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
Economics can be defined, more inclusively than its prevalent legal
framing, as the science of the social provisioning process.  That is, it is
the study of those social-economic activities that generate the re-
sources that sustain social individuals, their social relationships, and
society as a whole.52 But, what is left unstated is that this study is
mediated by a “specific and often implicit worldview.”53  Mainstream
approaches to that science trace their origins to the nineteenth-cen-
tury recalibration of the soft science of “political economy” via the
precision, the certainty, and most important, the purportedly objec-
tive, value-neutrality of mathematics into today’s hard economic
science.54
In the context of increasing differentiation and diversity, in aca-
demic and socio-political thought, the idea of objective and value-neu-
tral analysis is, arguably, alluring and, undeniably, uninhibiting. This is
a further attraction of the use of economics in property analysis.
However, that commitment obscures the existence and denies the sub-
jectivity of the values embedded in the analysis.  That erasure, in turn,
disaggregates those values from the consequences and implications of
both descriptive and prescriptive economic pronouncements.  And,
that disaggregation leaves the sides of the property cleavages de-
scribed here arguing at cross-purposes.55  From the dominant perspec-
tive, where the values property pursues (at least operationally) are
uncontroverted and contested values are political questions outside
the scope of economic analysis, it is unclear what critiques have to
offer by way of concrete legal proposals.  Critics, on the other hand,
primarily aim at changing the values animating the calculus, even if
individual settlements would not drastically change.  This leaves the
question: What is gained by the specious objectivity and neutrality?
A heterodox law and economics of property itself will not resolve
this disconnect.  But, in liberating property from the methods, ques-
51. See Tony Lawson, The Nature of Heterodox Economics, 30 CAMBRIDGE J.
ECON. 483, 497 (2006) (suggesting that heterodox critiques may be addressed within
critical mainstream economic analyses).
52. FREDERIC LEE, THE MAKING OF HETERODOX MICROECONOMICS 3–6 (2011).
53. Ken Wilbur, Forward to CHRISTIAN ARNSPERGER, FULL-SPECTRUM ECONOM-
ICS: TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE AND EMANCIPATORY SOCIAL SCIENCE xvii (2010).
54. Cahill & Patton, supra note 31, at 9.
55. See, e.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821,
842–44 (2009).
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tions, and values presupposed by mainstream economics, it offers new
horizons for the reconceptualization and reconciliation of property’s
circular dilemmas. Consider some examples presented above.  The
language with which adverse possession is understood would have to
be fundamentally revised if the doctrine were framed as a mediator of
social and class interaction.  In the same vein, eminent domain would
necessarily be re-envisioned under an Austrian approach, and prevail-
ing productive priorities in the commodification of bodily substances
will be altered by feminist economics.  In each case, both the central
questions and the calculus are different.  The recasting of property law
through heterodox approaches also offers new horizons for existing
critiques of the law and economics of property law.  For example, the
progressive property theorists struggle to reconcile their recognition
of the inextricable connection between property and economics with
their particularized critiques of mainstream economics and alternative
values they want incorporated into robust property discourse.  The di-
verse values and commitments they argue should be part of econom-
ics—heterodox economics reveals—are part of economics. In this
way, a heterodox law and economics of property could also begin to
revolutionize property discourse.  Are the ultimate outcomes always
different?  That is hardly clear, but that is not the point.  The point is
to open the door to a value-centric economic discourse of property.  A
heterodox law and economics of property engages that fact property
law is not neutral, and embracing heterodox economic theories forces
property scholars to engage hard questions and uncomfortable reali-
ties—not as limited avenues of critical inquiry, but as central to the
task of studying property.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Essay has defended both economics as valuable tools for the
analysis, description, and prescription of property law and its detrac-
tors, who recognize the refusal of economics to respond to property’s
communitarian and egalitarian mandates.  To advance that defense, it
suggests that the pluralist application of heterodox economics theories
to property jurisprudence could bridge the divides between these
camps. In so doing, the preceding discussion has painted in broad
strokes that do not reflect the richness of debates, variety of literature,
scope of commentary, or ambiguity and permeability of categories.
But, the essence is captured and the message conveyed is accurate.
The institution of property and the law that structures and governs
that institution—with only (maybe) the slightest hint of hyperbole—
are the pillars of much of the legal system.  Property’s deontological
questions are and can be economic questions, as well.  The addition of
a heterodox economic analysis of property law can only serve to en-
rich and complete debates by synthesizing and responding to that in-
stitution’s diverging and polarizing commitments.
